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ABSTRACT
Use of medical data, also known as electronic health records, in research helps de-
velop and advance medical science. However, protecting patient confidentiality and
identity while using medical data for analysis is crucial. Medical data can be in the
form of tabular structures (i.e. tables), free-form narratives, and images. This study
focuses on medical data in the free form longitudinal text. De-identification of elec-
tronic health records provides the opportunity to use such data for research without
it affecting patient privacy, and avoids the need for individual patient consent. In
recent years there is increasing interest in developing an accurate, robust and adapt-
able automatic de-identification system for electronic health records. This is mainly
due to the dilemma between the availability of an abundance of health data, and
the inability to use such data in research due to legal and ethical restrictions. De-
identification tracks in competitions such as the 2014 i2b2 UTHealth and the 2016
CEGS N-GRID shared tasks have provided a great platform to advance this area.
The primary reasons for this include the open source nature of the dataset and the
fact that raw psychiatric data were used for 2016 competitions. This study focuses
on noticeable trend changes in the techniques used in the development of automatic
de-identification for longitudinal clinical narratives. More specifically, the shift from
using conditional random fields (CRF) based systems only or rules (regular expres-
sions, dictionary or combinations) based systems only, to hybrid models (combining
CRF and rules), and more recently to deep learning based systems. We review the
literature and results that arose from the 2014 and the 2016 competitions and dis-
cuss the outcomes of these systems. We also provide a list of research questions that
emerged from this survey.
KEYWORDS
automatic de-identification, 2014 i2b2 UTHealth shared task, 2016 CEGS N-GRID
shared tasks, review, electronic health records, free text form, longitudinal data,
open source data
1. Introduction
Health records are an extremely valuable but arguably underutilised source of health
information for researchers. Such research is made possible by the widespread adapta-
tion of electronic health records (EHR) in routine health care (Murdoch and Detsky
(2013)). These records create large and continuously updated datasets which can then
be subjected to powerful analytic techniques.
De-identification of electronic health records (EHR) is the process of identifying and
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Figure 1. Example of EHR before and after de-identification.
removing any information that will reveal patient identity from medical records. It is
a method for protecting patient confidentiality and privacy before the use of EHR for
research purposes. This avoids the need for individual patient consent before medical
records (text or otherwise) are used in research. An automatic de-identification system
allows researchers to use all the medical data sources available and utilise data-driven
models to improve health outcomes.
The de-identification of EHR consists of two stages. The first stage is to identify
protected health information (PHI). The second stage is to replace the identified PHI
with realistic surrogates. Figure 1 provides an example of EHR before and after de-
identification. From this example it is evident PHI such as hospital name, patient
name, date etc. are replaced with realistic surrogates. As illustrated in Figure 1, after
de-identification the structure and readability of the original text document should
still be maintained (Stubbs, Uzuner, Kotfila, Goldstein, and Szolovits (2015)).
One of the significant difficulties in de-identifying the records is complying with the
legal requirements. Rules and regulations are provided by the Health Insurance Porta-
bility Accountability Act (HIPAA) to de-identify EHR (Garfinkel (2015); Stubbs et al.
(2015)). In New Zealand, patient privacy is protected by the Health Information Pri-
vacy Code and the Health and Disability Consumers’ Code of Rights (Commissioner
(2009); Office of the Privacy Commissioner (2013)). Although there is no one standard
set of rules and methods for de-identification, the HIPAA Privacy Rule is arguably the
worldwide gold standard (Garfinkel (2015)). HIPPA considers Expert Determination
and Safe Harbor to be the two acceptable methods of de-identification. Expert Deter-
mination relies on a person with specialist knowledge and experience to ensure only
a minimal, statistically acceptable level of risk of identifying an individual is present
(Garfinkel (2015)). Organisations such as the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the Health
Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST), the Pharmaceutical Users Software Exchange
(PhUSE) and the Council of Canadian Academics, have adapted expert determination
standards for de-identification (Chester (2018a)).
The Safe Harbour method provides guidelines on 18 categories of PHI and requires
all information that identifies the patient be to be removed before records are shared
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Table 1. HIPAA categories for de-identification using the Safe Harbour method.
Rule PHI Identifier Descriptions
Number
1 Names
2 All geographic subdivisions smaller than state
(e.g. zip code, street address, city)
3 All elements of date (except year)
4 Telephone numbers
5 Fax numbers
6 Electronic mail addresses
7 Social security numbers
8 Medical record numbers
9 Health plan beneficiary numbers
10 Account numbers
11 Driver’s certificate/license numbers
12 Vehicle identification and serial numbers, including license plate numbers
13 Device identifier and serial numbers
14 Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
15 Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
16 Biometric identifiers
17 Full face photographic images and any comparable images
18 Any other unique identifying numbers, characteristics or codes.
outside the clinical setting (Stubbs, Filannino, and Uzuner (2017); Stubbs and Uzuner
(2015a)). These categories are presented in Table 1.
The primary challenge for de-identification of unstructured clinical data is that while
identifying and replacing PHIs the integrity of data needs to be protected (Kushida,
Nichols, Jadrnicek, Miller, Walsh, and Griffin (2012); Meystre, Friedlin, South, Shen,
and Samore (2010); Uzuner, Luo, and Szolovits (2007)). This needs to be achieved in
the presence of ambiguities (such as lexical overlap between PHI and non-PHI) and
out-of-vocabulary words (such as misspelt and foreign words in PHIs) (Uzuner et al.
(2007)). For example, while the de-identifying name, it is essential to recognise the
difference between the patient name, doctor’s name and a spouse (or family member)
name that may also be in the EHR. There is a need to be consistent while generating
surrogates. This issue is even more complicated when the data is longitudinal of nature.
Another major issue is that studies have shown that even with very few entities
(such as gender, date of birth, ZIP code, and address over a time) reconstructions of
identity is possible (Rothstein (2010)). For example, Governor Weld of Massachusetts
had his health records identified from “anonymised” records of state employee hospital
visits (Rothstein (2010)). Patients are concerned about the privacy and confidentiality
of their health information if it is used for research, especially concerning sensitive
items such as sexual history, genetic disease and mental health (King, Brankovic, and
Gillard (2012)). However, these concerns decrease when demonstrable measures are
taken to protect privacy (King et al. (2012)).
De-identification of EHR can be done manually or automatically. Manual de-
identification is time consuming, tedious, costly, can only be done by a restricted
set of individuals allowed access to the original patient notes, and is subject to human
error (Bui, Wyatt, and Cimino (2017); Dehghan, Kovacevic, Karystianis, Keane, and
Nenadic (2015); Dernoncourt, Lee, Uzuner, and Szolovits (2017); He, Guan, Cheng,
Cen, and Hua (2015)). There have been many attempts to develop an automatic sys-
tem that will de-identify EHR with certainty. Several systems have been proposed,
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but they are not frequently used in practice. These include Anonym software (Zuc-
con, Kotzur, Nguyen, and Bergheim (2014)), MITRE’s MIST tool (Aberdeen, Bayer,
Yeniterzi, Wellner, Clark, Hanauer, Malin, and Hirschman (2010)), CCHMC (Deleger,
Molnar, Savova, Xia, Lingren, Li, Marsolo, Jegga, Kaiser, Stoutenborough, and Solti
(2013)), CRATE (Cardinal (2017)) and FASDIM (Chazard, Mouret, Ficheur, Schaf-
far, Beuscart, and Beuscart (2014)). In addition, Meystre et al., (2010) (Meystre et al.
(2010)) presents an overview of several other de-identification systems that are avail-
able.
Techniques used for de-identification of EHR fit into three categories: rule-based,
machine learning based and hybrid, which is a combination of both rule-based and
machine learning-based. Rule-based techniques use dictionaries and hand-coded rules,
and rely on patterns expressed as regular expressions that are defined and tuned by
humans (Bui et al. (2017); Dernoncourt et al. (2017); Lee, Wu, Zhang, Xu, Xu, and
Roberts (2017)). Rule-based systems also require an expert to provide knowledge of
these rules. They do not need significant training data and are easily modifiable. Com-
pared to machine learning approaches, rule-based approaches can distinguish some am-
biguous instances, such as the difference between medical record numbers and phone
numbers (Liu, Chen, Tang, Wang, Chen, Li, Wang, Deng, and Zhu (2015)). How-
ever, rule-based methods have limitations, as they require additional data curation or
annotation by domain experts (Lee et al. (2017); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). Also,
with rule-based systems, the rules in one system are not easily adoptable by another
system (Liu, Tang, Wang, and Chen (2017)). Machine learning approaches, on the
other hand, can be trained to recognise PHI patterns automatically. The most popu-
lar machine learning techniques used are conditional random fields (CRF) (Bui et al.
(2017); Dehghan et al. (2015); He et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi
(2015)), support vector machines (Khalifa and Meystre (2015); Stubbs, Kotfila, Xu,
and Uzuner (2015)), hidden Markov models (Chen, Cullen, and Godwin (2015)), and
neural networks (Dernoncourt et al. (2017)). However, the main downside to machine
learning techniques is that they require significantly large labelled datasets as well as
feature engineering (Dernoncourt et al. (2017); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). Machine
learning systems perform worse than rule-based systems on rare types of PHI due to a
dearth of training data (Lee et al. (2017)). Hybrid systems, combining rules and ma-
chine learning, are currently the most popular and most effective systems (Dehghan
et al. (2015); Lee et al. (2017); Liu et al. (2015, 2017); Stubbs et al. (2015); Stubbs
and Uzuner (2017); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)).
An initial impression is that de-identification of EHR is a relatively straightforward
problem. The basic idea of de-identification is simple, and as mentioned above there are
many tools and software programs available. However, in reality, it is an essential and
currently unsolved problem in the medical informatics domain. The main reason is that
the accuracy, precision, robustness and adaptability of the available open source tools
and systems are mediocre (He et al. (2015); Meystre et al. (2010); Meystre, Ferra´ndez,
Friedlin, South, Shen, and Samore (2014); Stubbs et al. (2015); Stubbs and Uzuner
(2015b); Uzuner and Stubbs (2015); Zheng, Vydiswaran, Liu, Wang, Stubbs, Uzuner,
Gururaj, Bayer, Aberdeen, Rumshisky, Pakhomov, Liu, and Xu (2015)). Examples
of issues that complicate developing a well-performing de-identification system that
adapts to change include the nature, source, and type of dataset; the time frame of the
dataset; the intensity of PHI in the dataset; the kind of PHI; free-form text vs formally
defined texts. Unfortunately, most systems – BoB, MIT, MIST, HIDE, HMS, MeDS –
can misidentify clinical information as PHI (Meystre et al. (2014)). Ambiguous medical
terms require more accurate de-identification techniques (Meystre et al. (2014)). Also,
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most of the open source software only target specific PHI and not all of them (Meystre
et al. (2010)). It is argued that perfection cannot be achieved; however, 95% accuracy
is considered the rule of thumb and an acceptable value for accuracy (Stubbs et al.
(2017); Stubbs, Kotfila, and Uzuner (2015)).
In the past five years, there have been more than 100 papers published relating to the
de-identification problem. One of the main reasons for the recent development in the
literature is the EHR de-identification competitions. They provide an excellent plat-
form to achieve better results, and the data is open source (Bui et al. (2017); Stubbs
et al. (2017, 2015); Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a, 2017)). There have been three main
competitions relating to de-identification of EHR: the 2006 Informatics for Integrat-
ing Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) competition (Kumar, Stubbs, Shaw, and Uzuner
(2015); Uzuner and Stubbs (2015)); the 2014 i2b2/UTHealth shared task (He et al.
(2015); Stubbs et al. (2015); Stubbs and Uzuner (2015b); Uzuner and Stubbs (2015));
and the 2016 Centers of Excellence in Genomic Science (CEGS) and Neuropsychiatric
Genome-Scale and RDOC Individualized Domain (N-GRID) shared task (Bui et al.
(2017); Liu, Yang, Wang, Chen, Tang, Wang, and Xu (2017); Stubbs et al. (2017);
Stubbs and Uzuner (2017)). These competitions also included multiple tracks focus-
ing on issues such as smoking status classification (in 2006); coronary artery disease
(CAD) classification for diabetic patients (in 2014); classification of specific symptom
severity based on the psychiatric evaluation (in 2016).
Due to the abundance of literature in the recent years, this study restricts itself
to the most recent work and provides an overview of the 2014 i2b2/UTHealth shared
task, and 2016 CEGS N-GRID shared the task. This study primarily focuses on the
trend changes noticed in the techniques used to develop de-identification systems. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the most recent review paper since Meytre et
al., (2010) (Meystre et al. (2010)).
The rest of the paper is structured such that an overview of the 2014 and 2016
competitions is presented in section 2, resulting de-identification systems in section 3,
error analysis in section 4 and finally discussions in section 5.
2. Overview of the recent Competitions
This section provides a brief overview of the 2014 and 2016 competitions. Both 2014
and 2016 competitions used longitudinal data as it enables the understanding of each
patient’s medical records and their progress over time (months or years). It pro-
vides a more comprehensive clinical summary of patient-based clinical experience than
encounter-based or provider-based data. However, the main issue with using longitu-
dinal data is that it contains an abundance of personal information on each patient.
Collectively, longitudinal data is more likely to allow the piecing together of patient
identity (Stubbs et al. (2015); Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a)). Also, both competitions
used ”as is” raw data and reflects the realities of what the de-identification system
would have to handle in reality (Uzuner and Stubbs (2015)). Data was split 60/40 and
distributed into two parts. Initially, the training set for the development of the system
was distributed followed by testing set on a later date. For more details on the 2014
competition see Kumar et al., (2015) (Kumar et al. (2015)), Stubbs and Uzuner, (2015)
(Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a)), Stubbs et al., (2015) (Stubbs et al. (2015)), Stubbs and
Uzuner, (2015) (Stubbs and Uzuner (2015b) and Stubbs et al., (2015) (Stubbs et al.
(2015)). Details of the 2016 competition is presented in: Stubbs et al., (2017) (Stubbs
et al. (2017)), Bui et al., (2017) (Bui et al. (2017)) and Uzuner et al., (2017) (Uzuner,
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Stubbs, and Filannino (2017)).
2.1. 2014 i2b2/UTHealth Shared task
The 2014 i2b2/UTHealth shared task used diabetic patient longitudinal medical
records obtained from two large hospitals. The 2014 competition included four tracks.
Track 1, the de-identification track, is the primary interest of this survey. Track 1
was attempted by ten teams who submitted 22 system outputs for evaluation. The
best performing system of each team was evaluated, and three of the systems achieved
F-measures over 0.90 (Stubbs et al. (2015)). A number of the top performing systems
used a hybrid model combining regular expressions and rules with machine learn-
ing based systems (Dehghan et al. (2015); Stubbs et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi
(2015)). The conditional random field was the most popular machine learning system.
Categories such as ZIP, AGE and PHONE were considered easier, and PROFESSION
and LOCATION categories proved to be more difficult (Stubbs et al. (2015)). It was no
surprise that overall results for i2b2-PHI categories are worse than that of HIPAA-PHI
categories, as i2b2-PHI had much more specific categories than HIPAA-PHI (Dehghan
et al. (2015); He et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)).
2.2. The 2016 CEGS N-GRID Shared Task
The 2016 CEGS N-GRID shared task used psychiatric data, making it the first ever
competition to release psychiatric intake records (Lee et al. (2017); Stubbs et al.
(2017)). Psychiatric data much more challenging to de-identify, as they contain higher
density of PHIs, and is one of the main reasons why mental health notes are not com-
monly used for research purposes (Bui et al. (2017); Stubbs et al. (2017); Tran and
Kavuluru (2017); Uzuner et al. (2017)).
The 2016 competition included three tracks, of which the first track, track 1A and
1B, is the focus here. Track 1A was designed to evaluate existing systems from 2014
on the 2016 data without any further training or modification. It was designed to
test how well the systems performed on, and adapted to, data that is different from
the system’s original training data (Lee et al. (2017); Uzuner et al. (2017)). The
best performing system on this data for track 1A was from the Harbin Institute of
Technology Shenzhen Graduate School team, with an F-measure of 0.7985 (Stubbs
et al. (2017)). It is important to note that the fifth best team scored 0.5266 and
seventh team 0.1861; therefore the spread was vast. In general, most of the existing
systems submitted to this competition did not perform well on a new dataset (Stubbs
et al. (2017)). One potential reason for this is the nature of the dataset, as a psychiatric
dataset has more personal information and more text. However, it is a good start at
building models that can be tuned to new data (Uzuner et al. (2017)).
Track 1B was designed as a traditional evaluation system, and the systems were
trained and developed on the psychiatric dataset (Lee et al. (2017)). The best per-
forming system for track 1B was from the Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen
Graduate School again team with an F-measure of 0.9143 (Stubbs et al. (2017)). Seven
of the top teams had an F-measure higher than 0.8 with the tenth best team having a
score of 0.7175 (Stubbs et al. (2017)). Nearly all teams used hybrid systems for track
1B. Different PHI categories were detected by different systems (rules or machine
learning) and were combined at the end to address all PHI categories. For example,
some systems took the approach of using combinations of CRF addressing different
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PHI, and others combined CRF with bi-directional long-short-term memory systems
(Uzuner et al. (2017)). The top-performing teams made use of neural networks (Stubbs
et al. (2017)). Teams found PHI categories PROFESSION, LOCATION and ID to be
the most difficult categories, and DATE and AGE were the easiest to detect (Stubbs
et al. (2017)).
2.3. Gold Standard
The gold standard for 2014 and 2016 competitions training and testing corpus was de-
veloped using both manual and automatic processing (Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a,b)).
Experts with special training were used as annotators who worked in parallel to each
other. Data were de-identified under a risk-averse interpretation of HIPAA guidelines
(Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a)). This included the use of double annotation, arbitra-
tion, rounds of sanity checking and proofreading (Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a)). While
preparing the gold standard, the semantics and integrity of the data were maintained
such that the resulting data was useful and maximises the usability of the data for
research. It was ensured that the gold standard contained adequate representations of
PHI categories for the machine learning based system to learn automatically. Also, the
gold standard was created by replacing PHIs of the raw data with realistic surrogates
using both automatic systems and hand curation.
2.4. Evaluation
The NLP system, designed for the 2014 and 2016 competitions, contained seven main
PHI categories and 25 associated sub-categories (Dehghan et al. (2015); Uzuner and
Stubbs (2015); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). The seven main categories were Name,
Profession, Location, Contacts, IDs, Age and Dates (Dehghan et al. (2015)). Example
of the sub-categories includes patient name, doctor’s name and username for NAME
category (see Tubbs and Uzuner, 2015 (Stubbs and Uzuner (2015a) for full detail of
these categories). The use of sub-categories was only introduced in the 2014 competi-
tion, as the 2006 competition just focused on the seven types of PHI.
It was argued that HIPAA only provides a starting point for an effective de-
identification and that expanding the HIPAA definitions is believed to be more ef-
fective in solving the problem (Stubbs et al. (2015)). This is the primary idea behind
i2b2-PHI, where 25 subcategories were added to HIPAA-PHI to create i2b2-PHI cate-
gories (Stubbs et al. (2015)). In addition to the standard HIPAA-PHI, i2b2-PHI were
also used in the competitions as an evaluation tool.
De-identification performance is evaluated using Precision (P), Recall (R) and F-
measure (F1), where,
P =
true positive rate
true positive rate+ false positive rate
R =
true positive rate
true positive rate+ false negative rate
F1 = 2× P ×R
P +R
(1)
Evaluations of P, R and F1 were performed at the entity-level and token-level (Liu
et al. (2015); Stubbs et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). For entity-level, an
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exact match of the gold standard entity with the predicted entity is required. Whereas,
for token-level, each token is considered separately. One token of the golden standard
entity and the predicted entity is needed to match. Evaluations were performed against
the gold standard of i2b2 test data (Yang and Garibaldi (2015)), using strict evalu-
ation and relaxed evaluation. The strict metric involves exact string matching of the
predicted entity against the gold standard. The relaxed metric, on the other hand, is
approximate string matching with some leeway allowance at the end of a string. The
overall performance of the system was measured using both micro and macro eval-
uation matrics (Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). Macro evaluation calculates the scores
for each document and then takes the average across the corpus, and micro evalua-
tion calculates the scores for each annotation across the corpus. This study will focus
mainly on the micro-averaged F-measure as this was the primary evaluation measure
used for determining the performances of the systems.
3. Resulting de-identification Systems
This section presents the de-identification systems developed using the 2014 dataset
during and after the competitions. It also presents de-identification systems developed
as part of the 2016 competitions. It is important to note that at the stage of this
study, there was only evidence of the availability and use of the 2014 dataset, after
the competitions.
3.1. Top performing De-identification system in the 2014 competitions
This section provides an overview of some of the best-performing systems developed
during the 2014 competition, track 1 (de-identification track).
Table 2 presents overall performance micro F-measure for these systems. The micro
F-measures are the primary evaluation method for the de-identification task (task 1)
(Stubbs et al. (2015)). Overall, the HIPAA-PHI micro F-measure is always better than
that of i2b2-PHI micro F-measure. This is mainly because i2b2-PHI categories include
more PHI categories to de-identify than HIPAA-PHI categories. Three out of the top
ten teams had an F-measure of above 0.9 for the i2b2:PHI categories and four out
of the top ten teams had an F-measure of above 0.9 for the HIPAA:PHI categories
(Stubbs et al. (2015)). Table 3 presents the best and worst performing PHI categories
for these systems.
Table 2. The overall performance of some of the top teams in 2014 competitions. 2014 Top teams includes S1
(Yang and Garibaldi (2015)), S2 (Liu et al. (2015)), S3 (Dehghan et al. (2015)), S4 (He et al. (2015)) and S5 (Chen
et al. (2015)).
De-identification System i2b2-PHI HIPAA-PHI
Number Description Micro F-measure Micro F-measure
S1 Yang and Garibaldi (2015) 0.9360 0.9573
S2 Liu et al., (2015) 0.9124 0.9409
S3 Dehghan et al., (2015) 0.9065 0.9323
S4 He et al., (2015) 0.8852 0.9180
S5 Chen et al., (2015) 0.7549 0.7985
Table 4 presents examples of techniques used by the top teams in 2014 competitions
to de-identify PHIs. One of the main observation with 2014 competitions is that there
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Table 3. F-measures of best and worst performing categories in 2014 de-identification systems.
Systems Best PHI F1 Worst PHI F1
categories categories
S1 DATE, AGE, 0.94- PROFESSION 0.69
CONTACT, NAME 0.97
S2 AGE, DATE 0.94, PROFESSION, 0.69,0.79
0.97 LOCATION
S3 AGE, DATE, EMAIL, > 0.94 PROFESSION, 0.57, 0.27
PHONE, STREET, ZIP, ORGANISATION
MEDICAL, RECORD
S4 USERNAME, DATE, > 0.97 PROFESSION, 0.40- 0.69
MEDICAL, RECORD ORGANISATION,
COUNTRY
S5 NAME, CONTACT > 0.91 PROFESSION, AGE 0.42, 0.59
was no one uniquely favouring technique to any given PHI. CRF was the primary ma-
chine learning technique used in the 2014 competitions, with one exception presented
by Chen et al., (2015) (Chen et al. (2015)). Chen et al., (2015) (Chen et al. (2015))
presented a non-parametric Bayesian hidden Markov model using a Dirichlet process
(HMM-DP) and was the only top team to present a machine learning only system to
de-identify all PHI’s. Handcrafted rules and regular expressions used in the 2014 com-
petitions are particular to the dataset. Table 5 presents examples of regular expressions
used in the 2014 competitions for both tokenization (as part of pre-processing) and
PHI identification.
Evidently, in the 2014 competition, many top systems preferred hybrid approaches
with CRF being the most popular machine learning approach. These de-identification
systems included data specific rules and regular expressions to tackle PHIs such as ID
and CONTACT. Also, most teams performed well in PHI categories, such as NAME,
AGE and DATE, and poorly in PROFESSION and LOCATION.
3.2. Top performing de-identification system in the 2016 competitions
This section provides an overview of some of the best-performing systems in the 2016
competition, track 1B (de-identification track).
Table 6 presents overall performance F-measure for these systems. As with 2014
results, HIPAA PHI results are better than that of N-GRID PHI categories. This is
no surprise as N-GRID PHI includes all subcategories. Two out of the top ten teams
had an F-measure of above 0.9 for the N-GRID PHI categories and three out of the
top ten teams had an F-measure of above 0.9 for the HIPAA PHI categories (Stubbs
et al. (2017)). Table 7 presents the best and worst performing PHI categories for these
systems.
Table 8 presents examples of techniques used by the top teams in 2016 competitions
to de-identify PHIs. In contrast to the 2014 competition, there was a noticeable shift
towards the use of deep learning approaches such as bidirectional long short-term
memory network (bi-LSTM). Hybrid systems were the preferred choice by the top
performing teams. PHIs such as PHONE, FAX, EMAIL, URL and LICENSE only
occur very rarely; hence hand-crafted rules only are used to identify (Jiang et al.
(2017); Lee et al. (2017); Liu et al. (2017)). Table 5 presents examples of regular
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Table 4. Examples of combination of techniques used to de-identify PHI categories and sub-categories in 2014
competitions.
PHI categories Sub-categories Techniques
DATE Date CRF + Rules + Dictionary (S4); CRF + Rules (S3);
CRF + Rules + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
NAME Doctor CRF + Rules (S4); CRF + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
Patient CRF +Rules (S3, S4); CRF + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
Username Rules (S3); CRF + Rules (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
AGE Age CRF + Rules (S4); CRF + Rules + Keywords (S1);
Rules (S3); HMM-DP (S5)
CONTACT Phone Rules (S2,S3); CRF + Rules + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
Fax, Email Rules (S1,S2,S3); HMM-DP (S5)
URL Keywords (S1)
ID Medicalrecords Rules (S2,S3); HMM-DP (S5); CRF + Rules + Keywords (S1)
IDNUM Rules (S2,S3); CRF + Rules + Keywords (S1);
Rules + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
Device Rules + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
BioID Rules (S1)
Healthplan Keywords (S1)
LOCATION Hospital CRF + Dictionary (S3); CRF + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
City CRF + Rules + Dictionary (S4); CRF + Dictionary (S2,S3);
CRF + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
State CRF + Rules + Dictionary (S4); CRF + Dictionary (S2); CRF
+ Keywords (S1); Rules + Dictionary (S3); HMM-DP (S5)
Street CRF + Rules + Dictionary (S4); Rules (S3); HMM-DP (S5)
Zip Rules (S3); CRF + Dictionary (S2); CRF + Rules (S1);
HMM-DP (S5)
Organisation CRF + Dictionary (S3); CRF + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
Country CRF + Rules + Dictionary (S4); CRF + Dictionary (S2);
CRF + Keywords (S1); Rules + Dictionary (S3); HMM-DP (S5)
Location-Others Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
PROFESSION Profession CRF + Dictionary (S3); CRF + Keywords (S1); HMM-DP (S5)
Table 5. Examples of regular expressions used in 2014 and 2016 competitions for both tokenization and PHI
identification.
Processing Remarks Regular expression Examples
Stage
2014 - PHI PHONE \(\d{3}\)[ \t]?\d{3}[ \t]\d{4} (871) 720-9439
identification (S2) \d{3}[ \t]\d{3}[ \t]\d{4} 171-289-0968
\d{3}j\d{1}\d{4} 659-5187
2016 - PHI PHONE \(?(\d{3}\)?[-\t]?\d{3}[-\t]\d{4} (304) 911-4864
identification (S6) \d{3}\.\d{3}\.\d{4} 017.445.0833
Tokenization Before: d{2}/d{2}/d{4} After:
(2014) (S4) PEND01/26/2098 PEND 01/26/2098
Tokenization Before: \d{1,2}([/-])(\d{1,2}(\1))?\d{2,4} After:
(2016) (S10) 09/14/2067CPT 09/14/2067CPT
expressions used in the 2016 competitions for tokenization and PHI identification.
Due to the nature of the dataset, teams did find de-identification of 2016 dataset more
10
Table 6. The overall performance of some of the top teams in 2016 competitions for Track 1B, F-measures for N-
GRID entity and HIPAA entity.2016 Top teams includes S6 (Liu et al. (2017)), S7 (Lee et al. (2017)), S8 (Dehghan,
Kovacevic, Karystianis, Keane, and Nenadic (2017)), S9 (Bui et al. (2017)), and S10 (Jiang, Zhao, He, Guan, and
Jiang (2017))
De-identification System i2b2-PHI HIPAA-PHI
Number Description Micro F-measure Micro F-measure
S6 Lui et al., (2017) 0.9143 0.9293
S7 Lee et al., (2017) 0.9074 0.9247
S8 Dehghan et al., (2017) 0.8769 0.8993
S9 Bui et al., (2017) 0.8731 0.9102
S10 Jiang et al., (2017) 0.8570 0.8882
Table 7. F-measures of best and worst performing categories in 2016 de-identification system.
Systems Best PHI F1 Worst PHI F1
categories categories
S6 NAME, DATE, 0.92 - 0.97 PROFESSION, 0.65 - 0.85
CONTACT, AGEE LOCATION, ID
S7 NAME, DATE, 0.92 - 0.96 PROFESSION, 0.73 - 0.85
CONTACT, AGE LOCATION, ID
S8 AGE, DATE, 0.92 - 0.95 ORGANISATION, 0.56, 0.69
DOCTOR PROFESSION
S9 DATE, AGE, 0.91 - 0.96 PROFESSION, ID, 0.64 - 0.77
CONTACT LOCATION
S10 AGE, DOCTOR, 0.94 - 0.96 ORGANISATION, ID, 0.69 - 0.77
CONTACT, DATE PROFESSION, FAX
difficult than that of 2014.
3.3. Recent development using Competitions Data
This section presents development and improvement in automatic de-identification of
EHR using the 2014 competition datasets. At the stage of this study, there was only
evidence of the availability and use of 2014 competition dataset. The 2016 competi-
tion data is not available as an open source. There are many examples –such as Lee
et al., (2017) (Lee, Dernoncourt, and Szolovits (2017)), Dernoncourt et al., (2017)
(Dernoncourt, Lee, and Szolovits (2017)), Cormack et al., (2015) (Cormack, Nath,
Milward, Raja, and Jonnalagadda (2015)), Dai et al., (2015) (Dai, Shabbir, Chen, and
Wu (2015)– where the 2014 dataset is used for experiments. This paper will focus only
on the work relating to de-identification systems (similar to that of track 1).
Table 9 presents examples of techniques used by systems developed using 2014
dataset to de-identify PHIs. In comparison to Table 4 there is a definite shift to using
deep learning methods such as LSTM and recurrent neural networks (RNN). Although
the expected 95% accuracy was not achieved in all PHIs by these systems, the overall
F-measure was above 0.9. Also, all systems reported better F-measures to that of
the 2014 competitions systems for poor performing PHIs such as PROFESSION and
LOCATION. The change in trend, using deep learning only systems are welcoming
and will be of interest to explore further.
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Table 8. Examples of combination of techniques used to de-identify PHI categories and sub-categories in 2016
competitions.
PHI categories Sub-categories Techniques
DATE Date CRF + Rules (S7,S9); CRF + Dic (S8);
Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
NAME Doctor CRF (S7); CRF + Dic + Rules (S9); LSTM (S10);
CRF + Dic (S8); Bi-LSTM (S6)
Patient CRF (S7); CRF + Dic + Rules (S9); LSTM (S10);
CRF + Dic (S8); Bi-LSTM (S6)
Username CRF + Rules (S7); Rules (S9); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
AGE Age CRF + Rules (S7,S9); CRF + Dic (S8);
Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
CONTACT Phone CRF + Rules (S7); Rules (S6,S9); Dic (S8); LSTM (S10)
Fax CRF (S7); Rules (S6,S9); Dic (S8); LSTM (S10)
Email, URL CRF + Rules (S7); Rules (S6,S9); Dic (S8); LSTM (S10)
ID Medicalrecords Rules (S7,S9); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
Healthplan LSTM (S10)
Licence Rules (S6,S7,S9); Dic (S8); LSTM (S10)
IDNUM Rules (S7,S9); Dic (S8); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
LOCATION Hospital CRF (S7); CRF + Dic + Rules (S9); LSTM (S10);
CRF + Dic (S8); Bi-LSTM (S6)
City CRF (S7); CRF + Dic (S8,S9); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
State CRF + Rules (S7); CRF + Dic (S9); Dic (S8);
Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
Street CRF + Rules (S7); CRF + Dic + Rules (S9); Dic (S8);
Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
Zip CRF (S7); Dic (S8); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
Organisation CRF (S7); CRF + Dic + Rules (S9); LSTM (S10);
CRF + Dic (S8); Bi-LSTM (S6)
Country CRF (S7); CRF + Dic (S8,S9); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
Location-Others CRF (S7,S9); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
PROFESSION Profession CRF (S7); CRF + Dic (S8,S9); Bi-LSTM (S6); LSTM (S10)
Table 9. Techniques used to de-identify PHI categories in systems developed after the competitions using the 2014
dataset. These systems includes S11 (Phuong and Chau (2016)), S12 (Dernoncourt et al. (2017)), S13 (Shweta,
Kumar, Ekbal, Saha, and Bhattacharyya (2016)) and S14 (Li, Chai, Zhao, Nan, and Zhao (2016)).
PHI categories Sub-categories Techniques
DATE Date CRF + Rules (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
NAME Doctor, Patient CRF + Rules (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
Username CRF (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
AGE Age CRF + Rules (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
CONTACT Phone CRF + Rules (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
Fax, Email, URL CRF (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
ID all sub-categories CRF (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S140
LOCATION all sub-categories CRF + Rules (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
PROFESSION Profession CRF (S11); LSTM (S12); RNN (S13, S14)
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Table 10. Definitions of common types of errors.
Error type Description
Label errors An entity that belongs to category X is wrongly classified into
category Y or entity identified by correct start and end string but
wrong type. For example, “John Smith” classified as location.
Extent error The location span of the entity overlapped with that of a gold
standard but not matched exactly. This could mean an entity has
an additional or missing part. For example, in “John Smith”
only “Smith” is classified as name.
Spurious errors An entity is found in the system but not in the gold standard.
This means the location span of the entity had no overlap with
any correct entity. For example, “visited the hospital”
classified as name.
Missing error The location span of the entity in the gold standard had no
(also called as overlap with that of any entity in the system. This also refers
omissions errors) to an entity found in the gold standard but not in the system
output. For example, “John Smith” not classified as a PHI.
4. Error Analysis
Several of the de-identification systems developed during the competitions performed
independent error analysis. Table 10 describes the most common types of errors that
were defined by both 2014 and 2016 competition participants (Dehghan et al. (2015);
He et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)).
In both 2014 and 2016 competitions, most of the label errors fall into inter-PHI
ambiguity instances, such DOCTOR and PATIENT. It is challenging to distinguish
between PATIENT and DOCTOR as they both fall under the same main category,
NAME (He et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). The 2016 competitions found
sub-categories LOCATION and CONTACT had similar problems (Jiang et al. (2017)).
The main issue with a label error is it will leave false placeholders and can cause
confusion if it is a false positive (Lee et al. (2017)). If it is a false negative it is missed
entirely.
In the 2014 competition, it was observed that among the PHI categories DATE is
responsible for one-third of the extent errors. Yang and Garibaldi (2015) (Yang and
Garibaldi (2015)) reported that out of the 1161 errors 69.7% occurred due to missing
errors. He et al., (2015) (He et al. (2015)) also reported missing errors to be 64.42%.
In 2016 competitions, missing error occurs more often in subcategories with few in-
stances of training data. For example, EMAIL, URL, MEDICAL RECORD; CON-
TACT, PROFESSION and ORGANISATION had the highest missing rates (Jiang
et al. (2017)). Missing errors are also more serious as they have the highest risk of
revealing patient identity (He et al. (2015); Lee et al. (2017)).
In comparison to missing errors, the proportion of spurious errors is much lower
(He et al. (2015)). Spurious errors occurred when tokens had similar lexical or con-
textual features with real PHI entities - e.g., DATE, AGE (Jiang et al. (2017)). It
falsely removes non-PHI information which may be important for clinical or research
applications (Lee et al. (2017)).
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There were additional sources of error that were mentioned concerning the 2016
competition in comparison to that of 2014. These include, acronyms and misspelt
words, unknown name entities and errors due to the corpora and annotation problems.
Acronyms and misspelt words are caused by wrongly recognising and classifying PHIs.
However, recognising and classifying acronyms and abbreviations is hard as they can
be medical terms or non-medical terms. For example, NAME: NC, NG etc. and DATE:
Su, Tu, We etc. (Bui et al. (2017)). Corpora and annotation problems occur mainly
due to merged words causing missing PHI, for example “Hancevillewith”. Also, error
is caused by false negative annotations (Bui et al. (2017)). Also, the reliance on using
dictionaries and ML approaches, where unseen terms and unfamiliar contexts cause
difficulties in identifying person and location resulted in errors.
Dernoncourt et al., (2017) (Dernoncourt et al. (2017)) were also interested in the
following sources of the errors: abbreviations, ambiguities, data sparsity and debatable
annotations. They found that abbreviations and ambiguities are the most challenging
source of errors to address to improve the performance further. Abbreviations can be
a source of confusion and error even for trained health professionals. For example, the
dosing instruction “QD” can be interpreted as either “once a day” or “four times a
day”. Sparsity may be resolved by increasing the size of the training set and including
more instances of difficult PHI types.
5. Discussion
This section presents a general discussion on de-identification of EHR followed by
the summary and observations of the de-identification systems from the 2014 and
2016 competitions, and systems developed using competition data. Also, this section
presents research questions for possible future avenues.
5.1. De-identification - a general discussion
There is a great interest internationally in applying data-driven techniques to elec-
tronic health records (Murdoch and Detsky (2013)). However, privacy laws in many
jurisdictions require accurate de-identification of medical documents, such as discharge
summaries and electronic health records, before they can be shared outside of their
originating institutions. De-identification of data provides opportunities for researchers
to use medical data without individual consent.
The sharing of records is crucial for advancing health research. For example, in the
2014 competition, the Heart Disease Risk Factors Challenge involved participating
research groups attempting to predict heart disease risk factors in diabetic patients
from longitudinal clinical narratives. As noted above, such a challenge would not have
been possible under United States law if the narratives, 1,304 medical records from
296 diabetic patients, were not de-identified first. In this case, the records were de-
identified with great care by multiple experts. Since most institutions would not be
able to afford the costs of such de-identification, automating the process is therefore
crucial for sharing data and advancing health research.
Accurate automatic de-identification systems also help gain public trust in accepting
the use of medical data for research purposes. As noted above, patients may be very
concerned about some elements of their records, such as sexual history or mental health
being traced back to them (King et al. (2012)). Patient privacy needs to be protected
by both the data holder and the data user (Roop (2018)). The data holder needs to
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ensure that the data is correctly de-identified before releasing it, and the data user
should only request the data they need and use if for the purpose it was issued for to
minimise the risk of re-identification.
On the other hand, the existing HIPAA Safe Harbor standard may already limit
researchers ability to perform various studies by masking relevant information, such
as restricting location to three-digit zip codes (applicable to many social and public
health studies), which may limit accuracy in health research (Benitez, Loukides, and
Malin (2010)). However, the Safe Harbor method has the advantage of being set by
law, which reduces legal liability and reputation risk (Benitez et al. (2010); Roop
(2018)).
The alternative standard of de-identification allowed by HIPPA is Expert Deter-
mination, where a suitably qualified individual certifies that the record has been de-
identified to the extent that the risk of re-identification is acceptably low. The level of
de-identification needed under this standard depends on context and risk. This allows
the data to have the maximum value for the research at hand while still maintain-
ing privacy. However, Expert Determination requires enough people with the skills
necessary to safely make these determinations, widely accepted industrial standards,
and de-identification techniques that will meet these standards (Benitez et al. (2010);
Chester (2018b)).
5.2. Summary of the competitions and de-identification systems
De-identification competitions such as that of 2014 and 2016 provide excellent oppor-
tunities for researchers to further develop research in this area. One primary reason
these competitions are so widely recognised is the open source nature of the data. This
paper provided an overview of 2014 and 2016 competitions. Due to the difference in the
dataset and the content of the data, both competitions offered exciting developments
in this area of research.
In general, teams found the de-identification of 2016 dataset more difficult than
that of 2014. Also, HIPAA PHI categories were more straightforward to de-identify
than that of i2b2 PHI (for 2014 data) or N-GRID PHI (for 2016 data). As explained
earlier, i2b2 PHI and N-GRID PHI include additional and more complex categories to
the HIPAA regulations. The de-identification competitions argued that HIPAA PHI
is not enough for complete de-identification of the EHR, especially for a longitudinal
dataset. An example would be the detection of the difference between the patient’s
name and doctor’s name. Although the de-identification of NAME has high F-measure,
the differentiation mentioned above has not been achieved successfully. This adds an
extra layer of complexity.
In the 2014 competition, top systems preferred hybrid approaches with CRF be-
ing the most used machine learning approach. Considering ten teams got very high
F-measures (Stubbs and Uzuner (2015b), it is evident that the gold standard had
enough information presented. Lack of training examples may be one reason for the
PROFESSION category performing so poorly among all systems presented in that
competition (Stubbs et al. (2015); Yang and Garibaldi (2015)). In the 2016 competi-
tion, as in 2014, most of the top systems were hybrid systems with CRF and/or neural
networks systems combined with rule-based systems. In 2016, there was a noticeable
shift in favouring deep learning techniques with hand corded rules for specific PHIs.
The top-performing system in the 2016 competitions achieved a level of accuracy
very close to that recorded by the least experienced annotator (Uzuner et al. (2017)).
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However, it is important to note that 95% rule of thumb for accuracy was not reached
in either Task 1A or 1B (Stubbs et al. (2017)). Although there was a greater emphasis
on robustness, being able to customise a de-identification system to the data results
in much better outcome (Lee et al. (2017)). Regarding protecting privacy the three
categories that are harder to predict in 2016 competitions are also the ones that have
the potential to disclose patient identity (Stubbs et al. (2017)).
In both 2014 and 2016 competitions, the best approach was hybrid systems. It is
clear that hybrid systems have the potential of using the best of both rules-based
and machine learning-based approaches. Categories such as date and contact obtained
high F-measure in recently developed systems. Both of these categories also used
rules/regular expressions. It is also important to point out that de-identification sys-
tems that were developed using the 2014 dataset, post competitions, favoured deep
learning only systems, not hybrid systems.
There was a noticeable shift towards using neural networks in 2016 competitions
and systems developed after the 2014 competitions using 2014 data. Deep learning
techniques allow learning representations that are tailored to the task at hand, in this
case, de-identification. These representations have shown to be stronger than hand-
engineered features (Goldberg (2017)). This shift is welcome, but there is still more
scope to achieve perfection, adaptability and reproducibility.
The results from both the 2014 and the 2016 competitions are very high for the top
teams. However, it is important to note that there is a high variation in the frequency
of occurrence of PHIs. For example, PHIs such as DATE, NAME and DOCTOR occur
much more often than PHIs such as PROFESSION and ORGANISATION. These more
frequently occurring PHIs are also considered to be the easier to find entities, compared
to the less frequent PHIs. The higher F-measures seem to reflect this imbalance. Hence
the results may be misleading, i.e. high average F-measure does not imply good de-
identification performance on rare categories such as PROFESSION.
It is also evident that compared to the systems presented in the 2014 competitions,
2016 competition systems are much more complicated. The resulting gain in accuracy
seems rather small. This complexity makes it very hard to reproduce these systems
and also make it hard for others to replicate their results for scientific purposes.
It is also important to point out that an expert manually developed most of the
rule-based components of the systems for the given data. However, the adaptability
of these systems to new data remains an open question. This was partly evident from
track 1A 2016 competition results, where only a couple of systems produced average
results on a new dataset (in this case 2016). Looking at transfer learning (Thrun and
Pratt (1997) is, therefore, an opportunity. It might be worth exploring domains such
as search engine logs and law data, in which de-identified data is less sensitive than it
is in the medical field. Hence, it is possible to obtain large datasets suitable for transfer
learning.
More competitions such as that of the 2014 and the 2016 de-identification compe-
titions will undoubtedly provide more opportunities for solving the de-identification
problem. Emphasis on tracks such as that of track 3 in the 2014 competition and track
1A in the 2016 competition is also vital. The need for simpler systems that can be
reproduced and used in different applications is crucial.
One primary concern with these de-identification systems is how well they will per-
form with other datasets. Unfortunately, EHR differs in each institute, and sometimes
even in each department (Uzuner and Stubbs (2015)). Will these systems adapt to
the change in EHR? It is important to note both data for both 2006 and 2014 were
drawn from the same source, though 2014 data was much more extensive than for
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2006 (Stubbs et al. (2015)). However, the 2016 data was very different from that of
the other competitions. As track 1A from 2016 competition was explicitly designed to
address this issue, it was clear that apart from a couple of average results, the existing
systems did not perform well when the dataset was changed (Stubbs et al. (2017)).
It is a good start for building models that can be tuned to new data, and with more
competitions and new data, systems can be trained, and better accuracy might be
achieved.
These competitions have provided an excellent platform for developing and improv-
ing de-identification systems, but there is still a lot more work to be done to find a
solution to the de-identification problem.
5.3. Research Questions
Although these de-identification competitions have provided a great platform to de-
velop this area, some questions/areas are worth exploring.
(1) Considering the noticeable changes across the systems - is the hybrid system
the best way to go? Could machine learning based system (for example, LSTM)
outperform and be more adaptable to a new dataset?
(2) Is the use of rules and regular expressions crucial for rare, occurring PHIs? If
so can we learn rules and regular expressions from data instead of handwritten
rules (as seen in these competitions)?
(3) Apart from the noted fact that some PHIs, such as PROFESSION and LOCA-
TION, perform poorly due to the low occurrence in training data, is there any
other reason for this? Especially considering the use of handwritten rules and
dictionary in the competitions, what are some other possible issues related to
the poor F-measure? Any possible solutions to these problems?
(4) Adaptability to a new dataset is a noticeable issue with the de-identification
systems. This is partly due to the lack of datasets. Could transfer learning be
used to solve this problem? If so, is there any similar datasets available from
domains such as law and crime science?
(5) Is there a way to obtain similar results to that of 2016 competitions with less
complicated, reproducible systems?
(6) Considering the 95% on HIPAA regulations is still to be achieved across all
PHIs - is there a need for stricter regulations, such as that introduced in these
competitions? If so the re-identification implications will be an interesting avenue
to explore.
(7) Systems developed using 2014 datasets after the competitions reported better
performances for poorly performing PHIs. Is there a reason for this change?
Would these systems do equally well if used for a different dataset? Can tech-
niques from these systems be adopted to develop a more robust and better
performing de-identification system?
(8) Would approaches such as word embeddings, which try and model the semantics
of words, better be able to capture rarely occurring PHIs as opposed to syntactic
approaches (given the lack of examples in the datasets to model the syntax of
the rare PHIs)?
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